Properly functioning markets effi ciently allocate resources. Such markets must refl ect certain principles, including consumer options, cost-based pricing, and economic neutrality. Transportation markets oft en violate these principles. This report examines these distortions and their implications for transport planning.
Introduction
The French social critic Voltaire's 1759 comic masterpiece Candide ridiculed the "optimistic philosophy" (also called "metaphysical optimism"), which claims that "all is for the best in this, the best of all possible worlds." The book's hero tries to maintain the optimistic philosophy when faced with various problems and insults, but eventually realizes that the existing world is not really optimal. The optimistic philosophy can be harmful by discouraging critical thinking, innovation, and reform.
The optimistic philosophy reappears occasionally in various guises. For example, some people claim that current transportation and land use pat-
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Todd Litman terns are optimal because they represent consumer preferences, and so eff orts to change these patt erns (called "mobility management" and "smart growth") must be harmful (Dunn 1998; Mills 1999; "Evaluating Criticism of TDM," VTPI 2005) . There is much to be said for lett ing consumers make their own choices, but it is important to consider market conditions before concluding that the resulting consumption patt erns are optimal. Love of markets must not be blind.
A properly functioning market is like a well-tuned machine: Consumers choose from various goods and make tradeoff s between factors such as quantity, quality, price, and location. Prices provide information about resource supply, production costs, and the value consumers place on goods. Profi ts give producers incentives to provide goods that consumers value, and competition encourages effi ciency and innovation. The result tends to maximize societal benefi ts. But to be effi cient, markets must refl ect certain principles:
• Consumer options. Consumers need viable options from which they can choose and make trade-off s between factors such as price, quantity, quality and location.
• Cost-based pricing. Prices (what consumers pay for a good) must refl ect marginal costs (what it costs to produce that good).
• Economic neutrality. Public policies (investments, taxes, subsidies, and regulations) should not favor one good or group over others, unless specifi cally justifi ed.
Consumption patt erns cannot be considered optimal if markets violate these principles. For example, current transportation patt erns are not necessarily optimal if they result from market distortions. Reforms that shift the market toward effi ciency could result in diff erent transport patt erns that make people bett er off overall.
This paper investigates the degree to which current transportation markets refl ect market principles, and the degree to which current transport activity is socially optimal and economically effi cient. Travel activity that exceeds this optimum can be considered economically excessive, which is travel that consumers would choose to forgo in a more effi cient market. Because transportation is aff ected by the location of activities (housing, jobs, public services, etc.), this paper also investigates related land use market distortions.
Market Principles and Distortions
This section examines in detail individual market principles, the degree to which they are refl ected in current transportation markets, and various types of market distortions.
Consumer Options
An effi cient market off ers consumers various options from which they can choose the combination that best suits their needs, as well as convenient information about available options.
Application to Transport Markets
An effi cient transportation market off ers various travel modes (walking, cycling, ridesharing, public transit, carsharing, delivery services, etc.), price and quality options (for example, being able to choose between cheap, basic public transport and more expensive, premium services). Similarly, effi cient markets off er consumers options regarding the location of activities such as housing and shopping. Consumers also need convenient and accurate information about their options. Even people who do not currently use a particular transport or location option can benefi t from having them available for possible use in the future, which economists call option value (Litman 2003) . Improving non-automotive transport and location options tends to benefi t physically and economically disadvantaged people in particular, and so increases equity.
Current Market Conditions
Although consumers have many options when purchasing motor vehicles and related services, they oft en have few options for non-automobile transport, and the options that do exist are oft en inconvenient, uncomfortable, expensive, stigmatized, and poorly integrated with other modes. Nonautomotive transport generally has limited levels of service (for example, public transit users are seldom able to choose among various levels of service at diff erent prices). Walking and cycling conditions are oft en poor, which can be a signifi cant barrier since most public transit trips include nonmotorized links.
Similarly, there are oft en few options for housing and services in multimodal locations. Those that exist are oft en either undesirable (located in older, degraded areas) or expensive (since so few exist, those that have a high level of neighborhood quality oft en command a high price). As a result, many households choose more automobile-dependent locations than they actually prefer (NAR and NAHB 2002; Litman 2006) . Anybody who doubts the inadequacy of current transport options should spend two weeks without using an automobile. With few exceptions, such as multi-modal neighborhoods in some cities and towns, non-drivers face signifi cant problems meeting basic accessibility needs.
This is not to say that governments must provide unlimited transport services or housing options regardless of their economic viability, but it does indicate that policies which reduce transport and location options (discussed later in this paper) tend to harm consumers, and policies that improve these options, particularly aff ordable options suitable for use by physically and economically disadvantaged people, tend to benefi t individual consumers and society overall.
Pricing
Economic effi ciency requires that prices (what users pay for a good) equal marginal cost (the cost of producing that good), unless a subsidy is specifically justifi ed. Effi cient pricing tests consumer demand. For example, it would be ineffi cient for society to pay $2 in road and parking facility costs to accommodate a vehicle trip that a motorist only values at $1. Charging motorists directly for the road and parking facility costs they impose eliminates lower-value trips while improving mobility for higher-value trips.
Current Market Conditions
Motor vehicle travel imposes various costs, including vehicle ownership and operating expenses, roads and parking facility costs, traffi c services, roadway land value, travel time, accident risk, congestion, and various environmental impacts (Delucchi 1996; Litman 2005) . Figure 1 illustrates one estimate of these costs, including monetized estimates of non-market costs such as travel time, accident damages, and environmental impacts. These are categorized as External (imposed on other people), Internal Fixed (borne by the motorist as a fi xed fee), and Internal Variable (borne by the motorist in proportion to how much they drive, which is equivalent to price).
In total, about a third of automobile costs are external and a quarter are internal-fi xed, as illustrated in Figure 2 . As a result, motorists perceive less than half the total costs imposed by their vehicle use when making individual trip decisions. Internal-fi xed costs give motorists an incentive to maximize their vehicle travel in order to get their money's worth from their large fi xed expenditures.
Put diff erently, motorists only receive part of the savings that result when they drive less. An effi cient transportation system gives drivers the full savings produced when they reduce their mileage, providing more effi cient incentive, as illustrated in Figure 3 . T ra v e l T im e V e h ic le O w n e rs h ip C ra s h D a m a g e s N o n -r e s . P a rk in g V e h ic le O p e ra ti o n R o a d w a y C o s ts T ra ff ic C o n g e s ti o n E n v ir o n m e n ta l C o s ts R o a d w a y L a n d V a lu e R e s id e n ti a l P a rk in g F u e l E x te rn a li ti e s T ra ff ic S e rv ic e s 
Fixed Internal Costs
Most vehicle expenses are fi xed costs, classifi ed as ownership costs rather than operating costs. Vehicle depreciation is generally considered a fi xed cost, although increased mileage reduces resale value and increases repair frequency. Vehicle insurance and registration fees are fi xed, although the costs they represent (insurance claims and roadway expenses) increase with vehicle use. Residential parking is also an internal-fi xed cost bundled with housing costs.
External Costs
Many motor vehicle costs are external. Although most people who bear these costs are themselves motorists (for example, most congestion delay and accident risk is borne by other road users), they are ineffi cient because individual consumers do not confront the costs they impose and so lack the incentive to reduce their impacts to optimal levels.
Parking subsidies are another signifi cant external cost of driving averaging hundreds or thousands of dollars annually per motor vehicle (Delucchi 1996; Litman 2005; Shoup 2005 ). This cost is borne by governments and businesses, and therefore indirectly by consumers through higher taxes and retail prices and lower wages.
A portion of roadway costs is external. Roadway user fees, such as fuel taxes and tolls, fund about 70 percent of roadway expenses. This percentage drops when other related services, such as traffi c policing, street lights, and emergency response, are included in the cost of providing roadways (FHWA 1997; DeCicco and Morris 1998) . Vehicle charges would need to increase 40 to 100 percent to fund roadways and traffi c services fully (Litman 2005) . By convention, roadway users pay no rent or taxes for roadway land, although economic neutrality requires charging the same as on competing uses of the land. Failure to charge for roadway land underprices road transport relative to rail (which pays rent and taxes on rights-of-way), underprices transport relative to other goods (for example, housing and agriculture, both of which have high land costs), and results in overinvestment in roads (Lee 1998; Litman 2005) .
Vehicle fuel production, importation, and distribution impose various external economic and environmental costs. Motor vehicle air pollution costs are estimated to average 1 to 5 cents per vehicle-mile, and more in certain areas (Delucchi 1996; Litman 2005) . Automobile use also imposes external accident costs estimated to range from 2 to 18 cents per vehiclemile (Edlin and Mandic 2001; Blincoe et al. 2002) .
Land Use Pricing
The costs of providing public services (utilities, roads, policing, schools, etc.), and environmental costs, tend to be lower in more compact, infi ll locations, but these savings are seldom refl ected in utility rates, development fees, or taxes (Litman 2004) . Effi cient land use pricing would reward consumers who choose more accessible locations. Residents of such areas tend to own fewer motor vehicles and drive fewer annual miles than residents of more automobile-dependent locations.
Economic Neutrality
Economic neutrality means that public policies (planning, investments, taxes, regulations, etc.) are not arbitrarily biased to favor a particular good, activity, or group.
Application to Transportation Markets
Neutrality requires that transport planning and investment practices allocate resources equally to comparable modes and users, unless special treatment is justifi ed for specifi c reasons such as equity (e.g., discounts for disadvantaged people), economic development (e.g., airport development), or other planning objectives (e.g., emergency vehicle priority). Because governments provide most transport facilities, regulate travel activity, control prices and taxes, and infl uence land use, public policies signifi cantly aff ect transport markets. Even modest bias can leverage signifi cant travel shift s. For example, if employee parking is income-tax exempt (an exemption worth about $300 annually per employee), employers tend to provide free parking (a benefi t worth about $1,500 a year per employee), which typically increases automobile commuting by 15 to 25 percent, and creates more automobile-dependent transport systems and land use patt erns.
Current Market Conditions
Current public policies tend to favor automobile use over other forms of accessibility in various ways described below.
Transport Planning
Current transport planning practices tend to favor automobile-oriented improvements, even when other solutions are more cost-eff ective and benefi cial overall ("Comprehensive Transport Planning," VTPI 2005). For example:
Performance Indicators. Conventional transport planning tends to evaluate transport based on mobility rather than accessibility, and so oft en results in planning decisions that reduce alternative travel options and land use accessibility ("Measuring Transportation," VTPI 2005) . For example, conventional transport planning tends to measure transport system performance primarily in terms of motor vehicle travel conditions, using indicators such as Roadway Level-of-Service, average traffi c speeds, and congestion indices. Other modes are given less consideration. This skews planning decisions to favor automobile-oriented improvements, and undervalues walkability, multi-modalism, telecommuting, and land use reforms (e.g., more mixed development) as transportation improvements.
Defi ning "Travel Demand." Conventional transport planning misdefi nes travel demand. In economics, demand refers to the relationship between price and consumption. It is a function. But transport planning oft en calculates demand at zero price, that is, free roads and parking. This creates a self-fulfi lling prophecy: roads and parking planning decisions are made to satisfy unpriced demand, and demand grows to fi ll the underpriced roads and parking. Generated Traffi c. Conventional transport project evaluation oft en ignores the eff ects of generated traffi c (additional traffi c that occurs when roadway capacity is expanded), which tends to exaggerate the net benefi ts of roadway improvements and undervalue alternative congestion reduction strategies ("Rebound Eff ects," VTPI 2005). One study found that transportation investment models that fail to consider generated traffi c overvalued roadway capacity expansion benefi ts by 50 percent or more (Williams and Yamashita 1992) . This skews planning decisions toward roadway capacity expansion and away from alternative solutions to traffi c problems.
Limited Range of Objectives and Impacts. Conventional transport project evaluation tends to focus on a limited set of planning objectives and impacts ("Comprehensive Transport Planning," VTPI 2005) . For example, when comparing highway and transit improvements conventional evaluation oft en overlooks the additional downstream congestion, parking costs, accidents, and pollution that result from expanded road capacity, and similarly overlooks savings that result from shift s to alternative modes (see Table 1 ). Conventional evaluation oft en assumes that everybody (at least everybody who counts) owns an automobile that would simply sit unused when they shift to alternative modes, and so ignores vehicle ownership savings from improved travel options. Similarly, conventional evaluation oft en ignores public health benefi ts of increased walking and cycling, community livability and walkability benefi ts from reduced automobile traffi c, and benefi ts from reduced pavement coverage. These omissions skew transport planning decisions to favor automobile-oriented improvements. Undervaluing Nonmotorized Transportation. Nonmotorized travel tends to be undervalued in planning and investment decisions because most travel surveys ignore or undercount short trips, travel by children, off -peak travel, and nonmotorized links of motorized trips (for example, a bike-bus-walk trip is oft en coded simply as a bus trip, and an auto-walk trip is coded as an auto trip, even if the nonmotorized link involved takes more time than the motorized link). Nonmotorized travel is actually two to six times more common than conventional data indicate ("Nonmotorized Evaluation," VTPI 2005). Since most transit and rideshare trips involve walking links, this reduces the viability of these modes too.
Transport Investments
Current investment practices are biased in ways that favor automobile transport relative to alternative modes or management solutions, even when those alternatives are more cost-eff ective and benefi cial overall (Ditt mar 1998; Lee 2000; Beimborn and Puentes 2003). Although some transport funds are now fl exible (they can be shift ed from highway to transit and mobility management programs), a signifi cant portion may only be used for roads (about half of all U.S. states have constitutional provisions that dedicate fuel taxes to roadways, and many Canadian provinces fund highways but not transit). Local matching rates are oft en lower for road project grants than for alternative modes. The availability of external roadway funding encourages transportation planners to expand highways and makes road pricing politically diffi cult to implement (Roth 1996) . Similarly, parking facilities oft en have dedicated funding that cannot be used for management programs (such as including parking costs in building budgets). There also tends to be more funding for motorist safety than for pedestrian and cyclist safety (STPP 1998).
Tax Policies
Many federal, state, and local government tax policies are biased in favor of motor vehicle use. Fuel is exempt from general taxes in many jurisdictions, land devoted to public roads and parking facilities is exempt from rent and taxes, and petroleum producers are given signifi cant tax exemptions and subsidies (Litman 2005) . Business and income tax policies tend to encourage companies to subsidize automobile parking as an employee benefi t, since a parking space would cost a typical employee nearly twice as much in pre-tax income as what it costs their employer to provide. Mileage reimbursement and tax exemption rates are usually higher than marginal vehicle operating costs, so employees perceive fi nancial incentives to maximize their business driving.
Automobile-Oriented Land Use Development Policies
Many current zoning codes and development practices favor automobileoriented land use patt erns (Moore and Throsnes 1994; "Smart Growth Reforms," VTPI 2005) . These include minimum parking requirements, density restrictions, single-use zoning, and automobile-oriented street designs. The result is a self-fulfi lling prophecy: more automobile-oriented land use, reduced travel alternatives, more driving.
Potential Market Reforms
Various reforms can help create more effi cient transportation markets.
Pricing Reforms
Various reforms can increase transport system effi ciency by making prices more accurately refl ect marginal cost (Litman 2005; Litman 2006 ). These reforms and their travel impacts are summarized in Table 2 . Convert currently fi xed insurance and registration fees into distance-based fees.
5-10¢ per vehicle-mile. 10% mileage reduction per aff ected vehicle.
Charge motorists directly for using parking facilities.
$1-5 per trip, or 10-20¢ per vehicle-mile.
10-20% mileage reduction.
Charge motorists directly for all roadway costs, including rent and property taxes on roadway land.
5-10¢ per vehicle-mile. 10% mileage reduction.
Charge individual motorists for congested delays they cause other road users.
5-25¢ per vehicle-mile in congested conditions. 10% urban-peak, 2% total vehicle travel reduction.
Environmental fees (additional fees for air, noise and water pollution).
2-5¢ per vehicle-mile. 2-5% mileage reduction.
Fuel taxes (internalize currently extneral fuel production and distribution costs).
0.5-3¢ per vehicle-mile. 1-2% mileage reduction.
Transportation Planning Reforms
Least-Cost Planning (or Integrated Planning) is an approach to resource planning that implements demand management solutions whenever they are more cost eff ective than capacity expansion, taking into account all signifi cant impacts ("Least Cost Planning," VTPI 2005) . This approach tends to increase investment in alternative modes and mobility management strategies for addressing transportation problems such as congestion, accident risk, and pollution emissions. Where these reforms are implemented they would probably reduce long-run per-capita automobile travel by 5 to 10 percent.
Land Use Planning Reforms
Various smart growth land use reforms include reduced and more fl exible parking requirements, support for more compact and mixed land uses, public investment practices that favor infi ll over sprawled development, more accessible and walkable roadway design, location-based utility pricing and tax rates, and encouragement for urban infi ll development ("Smart Growth Reforms," VTPI 2005) . These reforms could probably shift about 20 percent of households and worksites to more accessible locations where per-capita vehicle travel is 20 percent lower, resulting in a 4 percent reduction in total vehicle travel. Table 3 summarizes the various categories of transportation market distortions. 
Summary

Consumer
Options and Information
Markets often off er limited alternatives to automobile transportation and automobileoriented location.
Recognize the value of alternative modes and more accessible development in planning decisions.
Underpricing
Many motor vehicle costs are fi xed or external.
As much as feasible, convert fi xed costs to variable charges and charge motorists directly for the costs they impose.
Transport Planning Practices
Transportation planning and investment practices favor automobile oriented improvements, even when other solutions are more cost eff ective.
Apply least-cost planning so alternative modes and management strategies are funded if they are the most costeff ective way to improve transport.
Land Use Polices
Current land use planning policies encourage lower-density, automobile-oriented development.
Apply smart growth policy reforms that support more multi-modal, accessible land use development.
These categories are not mutually exclusive. There is considerable interaction and overlap among them. For example, planning and funding biases that favor roadway investments lead to automobile underpricing (i.e., free roads and parking) and more automobile-oriented land use patt erns, which reduce travel options. As a result, it is inappropriate to simply add up the eff ects of individual distortions or reforms.
It is not possible to predict exactly how travel would change under a more optimal market, but automobile travel would probably decline significantly. International comparisons indicate that transport market conditions signifi cantly aff ect travel patt erns. For example, compared with the U.S., per-capita automobile travel is about 35 percent lower in wealthy European countries and 50 percent lower in Japan ("Transportation Statistics," VTPI 2005), although some market distortions are still common in these countries, including fi xed vehicle insurance and registration fees, free parking, and signifi cant pollution and accident externalities. This indicates that a comprehensive set of market reforms could reduce per-capita vehicle travel even in those countries.
Possible Justifi cations for Distortions
Various arguments that have been presented to justify the transport market distortions identifi ed in this paper are discussed below (Dunn 1998; Mills 1999; "Evaluating TDM Criticism," VTPI 2005) .
Consumer Preferences
Some people argue that automobile-oriented policies and high levels of vehicle travel refl ect consumer preferences. But true consumer preferences can only be determined in an effi cient market. Excessive vehicle travel resulting from market distortions is ineffi cient and harms consumers overall. Skeptics may question whether market reforms that reduce vehicle travel make society bett er off overall. They may ask, "Since driving provides benefi ts, how can reforms that reduce vehicle travel increase benefi ts?" The answer is that reforms give consumers more of the savings that result when they drive less. Consumers would only forgo vehicle travel that they value less than these savings. Higher-value vehicle trips would continue. The travel patt erns that result from a less distorted market would refl ect true consumer preferences.
External Benefi ts
Some people claim that external transportation costs are off set by external benefi ts, such as economic benefi ts from vehicle expenditures. But there is no reason to expect large external benefi ts, since rational consumers and businesses try to internalize benefi ts and externalize costs. For example, businesses that provide jobs generally try to obtain concessions such as subsidies and tax discounts. Many claimed external benefi ts, such as jobs and tax revenues, are economic transfers rather than true economic benefi ts. As a result, it would be a mistake to expect external costs to be off set by external benefi ts.
Economic Development Benefi ts
People oft en claim that automobile-oriented policies support economic development, but most examples they cite refl ect economic transfers (one group benefi ts at another's expense) rather than net productivity gains. When the roadway, vehicle, and petroleum industries were fi rst developing (from 1900 until about 1950) underpricing may have helped achieve economies of scale (i.e., you benefi ted if your neighbors drive more because this reduces your costs), but such economies no longer exist; there are now diseconomies of scale, at least for urban peak travel (you now benefi t if your neighbors use alternative commute modes because this reduces your congestion costs). Mobility management tends to support economic development ("Economic Development Impacts," VTPI 2005).
Cost Uncertainty
Critics of transport market reforms sometimes argue that motor vehicle costs (particularly non-market environmental impacts) are diffi cult to quantify and so it is impossible to determine optimal prices ("Criticism of Transportation Costing, " Litman 2005) . However, many of the proposed reforms refl ect well-studied economic costs (insurance, roads, parking, land values), and have been endorsed by professional organizations.
Transaction Costs
Some degree of underpricing is justifi ed due to transaction costs (costs to governments and businesses of collecting fees and costs to motorists of paying fees). It may not be cost eff ective to charge motorists for small fees, or at dispersed destinations, or to disaggregate fees into small increments. However, new electronic pricing systems can greatly reduce transaction costs and allow more precise and fl exible fees (for example, rates that vary by time, location, and vehicle type, with special need-based discounts).
Equity and Aff ordability
Motor vehicle underpricing is oft en justifi ed to make driving aff ordable to lower-income households. User fees such as road tolls, parking fees, and higher fuel taxes are considered regressive. But the equity impacts of such charges actually depend on available travel options and how revenues are used. If consumers have good alternatives to driving and revenues benefi t lower-income households (they replace regressive taxes, fund services that benefi t the poor, or provide cash rebates), higher user charges can be neutral or progressive overall ("Pricing Evaluation," VTPI, 2005) . Transportation market distortions tend to be regressive because they reduce travel options for non-drivers and force people who drive less than average to subsidize others who drive more than average. For these reasons, distortions that favor automobile travel are inappropriate ways to increase equity.
Other Subsidies
Some people argue that automobile subsidies are justifi ed to balance public transit subsidies (Cox 2004) . Although transit subsidies may appear large, a signifi cant portion are justifi ed on equity grounds (to provide basic mobility to disadvantaged people) and effi ciency grounds (as a secondbest solution to reducing problems such as traffi c congestion, and to take advantaged of economies of scale). Because motorists travel more miles than non-drivers, and automobile transportation imposes so many costs, motorists tend to impose larger external costs than non-drivers when measured per capita. When properly evaluated there is litt le evidence that transit travel is subsidized more than automobile travel ("Transit Evaluation," VTPI 2005).
These arguments do not appear to justify current transport market distortions. Although it may not be possible to create absolutely perfect transportation markets, it is possible to reform current markets to signifi cantly increase effi ciency. To the degree that effi cient market reforms are not implemented and distortions continue, blunter strategies to control vehicle travel and reduce sprawl may be justifi ed on second-best grounds. For example, without effi cient pricing, it may be appropriate to limit vehicle travel with regulations, to subsidize otherwise unjustifi ed public transit services, and to impose urban growth boundaries.
Conclusions
Effi cient markets create harmony between individuals and society. Such markets internalize costs so society is not harmed when consumers increase their motor vehicle travel. Market distortions spoil this harmony. Current transport and land use markets are distorted in various ways that lead to economically excessive vehicle travel, impose external costs, and create confl icts. Although motorists directly benefi t from the additional mileage, it imposes indirect costs that makes most people worse off overall.
These impacts are cumulative and synergistic (total impacts are larger than the sum of individual impacts). For example, underpriced parking not only increases parking facility costs, it also increases traffi c congestion and accident costs, while underpricing road space increases parking costs and pollution emissions. Transport market distortions reinforce a cycle of increased automobile dependency, reduced consumer options, increased sprawl, and increased total costs.
Market reforms can lead to more effi cient transportation and land use patt erns. Many transport problems are virtually unsolvable without reforms. Such reforms tend to be particularly benefi cial to physically and economically disadvantaged people, who experience constrained options and high costs due to automobile-dependency.
Analyzing market distortions can be diffi cult and is somewhat subjective. Many distortions appear justifi ed to individual decision-makers. Zoning laws, planning practices, and tax structures were created to achieve certain social objectives. Pricing incurs transaction costs. It is not possible to provide all travel options everywhere. Whether a particular distortion is a "signifi cant problem" depends on perspective and assumptions. As a result, it may be infeasible to eliminate all transport market distortions, but effi ciency can improve signifi cantly with certain reforms that convert currently fi xed costs into variable charges, internalize currently external costs, apply least-cost planning and investment practices, and create more multi-modal, accessible communities.
These reforms would not eliminate automobile travel. Much driving provides benefi ts that exceed costs and so would continue in an effi cient market. But a signifi cant portion of driving consists of lower-value vehicle travel that consumers would willingly forgo if they were off ered bett er transport options and demand were tested with prices. In a more effi cient market, consumers would drive less, rely more on alternative modes, and be bett er off overall as a result. 
